Lessons From Brazil - How Tough Policing Can Reduce Lethal Crime

Here's more documented proof that intelligent and tougher policing can cut crime in a reasonable time frame regardless of the underlying social factors not changing.

'São Paulo homicide drop shows that effective measures can be taken to reduce lethal crime without waiting to solve underlying socioeconomic problems.'

http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=0a7ee25d39a7d2b0737cef8c76bc84b5 <http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=0a7ee25d39a7d2b0737cef8c76bc84b5>

'Editor's Note: Murders dropped by half in São Paulo since the year 2000. The singular fall of the violent crime in that city proves a disconnect between murder rates and wider socioeconomic forces, the writers say.

The murder rate in the state of São Paulo has been cut in half since 2000. The homicide decline in the state of São Paulo in the first decade of this century is similar to the decline in New York City in the 1990s. In both cases, the police adopted more effective methods. In São Paulo the state police forces gave new priority to gathering accurate and timely empirical data and using it to plan and evaluate programs.

An intergovernmental communications network was established to link the military and civil police. Crimes were entered into a geographic information system, and saturation units were sent to areas controlled by drug traffickers. A data base was established with photographs of over 300,000 criminals. Telephone switchboards were set up to receive citizen complaints of incidents, and a web site was opened to take reports of thefts of vehicles, documents and cellular telephones.

Community policing stations were opened, and a homicide combat unit was organized with an emphasis on solving difficult cases. A specialized unit was organized to provide supportive assistance to women who were victims of sexual crimes. Sophisticated computer software linked information from police reports with bank records, telephone records and probable areas of residence. And the police began more aggressive efforts to remove illegal firearms from the streets.

As a consequence of these efforts, the number of imprisonments in the state of São Paulo increased from 18,602 in the first quarter of 1996 to 30,831 in the first quarter of 2001, after which it settled back to approximately 23,000 a month. This increase in the number of convicts sent to prison each quarter of the year led to a steady increase in the state's prison population. The turning point in the state's criminal homicide rate came at the peak of this increase in imprisonments.

Gun control was another important factor in the crime drop. In October 2003, the Brazilian federal government enacted a new set of laws to limit the importation of firearms, make it illegal to own unregistered guns or to carry guns on the street, and increase the penalties for violation of gun control laws.'

Before the recent homicide drop, Brazil's high homicide rates were frequently attributed to high levels of poverty and inequality. In a recent book, historian Luís Mir insisted that Brazil was in a state of civil war and characterized São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro as metropolises of death.

Mir insisted that 'nothing can be done about the problem until the majority and the minority sit down and discuss the slices of the pie' that each social class receives (Geração Online, 2004). His book was published three years after the homicide rates in São Paulo had begun their sharp decline, yet no such radical re-slicing of the socioeconomic pie had taken place.

The same thing happened to leading American criminologists James Q. Wilson and John DiIulio who published works in the early 1990s predicting massive increases in crime rates after the rates had already begun their precipitous decline.

These analysts erred by attributing cyclical peaks in crime waves to persistent social and economic problems, underestimating the extent to which violent crime has its own dynamics and can be treated as a separate problem. When crime waves get out of hand the public demands action, political leaders allocate more resources, and the criminal justice system does its best to respond.

In both Brazil and the United States, police authorities took effective action to reduce violent crime without waiting for underlying social problems to be resolved. This was also true in Colombia where homicide declined 15 percent in the three years from 2003 to 2006.

By contrast, homicide rates in Venezuela have increased 67 percent since 1999 despite a booming economy and a populist government that claims to be redistributing wealth to the poor.

The great São Paulo homicide drop shows that effective measures can be taken to reduce lethal crime without waiting to solve underlying socioeconomic problems.

Kevin O'Brien Chang, Member,
PSOJ Standing Committee on National Security
changkob@hotmail.com

Disclaimer:
The arguments contained herein are those of the author and should not be taken as the position of the PSOJ.